

An Effective Governance for Development based on the Strategy of Anti-corruption in Singapore*

싱가포르에서 반부패 전략에 근거한 발전을 위한 효과적인 거버넌스

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국문초록

부패방지는 경제와 정치발전을 달성하기 위한 가장 중요한 요인들 중의 하나이다. 부패의 비용은 법치주의에 영향을 미치는 정치적 비용, 국부를 고갈시키는 경제적 비용, 정치 체제에 대한 국민의 신뢰를 떨어뜨리는 사회적 비용 등의 세 가지 영역에서 이해될 수 있다. 결과적으로 부패는 사회적, 문화적, 정치적, 경제적 발전을 저해하는 경제적 발전과 정치적 민주주의의 과정에서 장애요인으로 인식되고 있다. 효과적인 행정통제 시스템은 부패 방지를 위한 전략들을 보여주고 있다. 싱가포르의 사례는 제도적, 행정적, 사회적 개혁을 위한 부패 방지의 내부 통제 시스템의 성공적인 사례로 간주될 수 있다. 부패 방지 정치와 행정 시스템을 추진하기 위해서는 행정통제 전략과 부패방지의 관계를 분석할 필요가 있다. 이 논문은 싱가포르의 사례연구를 통한 부패 방지에 결정적인 역할을 하는 정책과 반부패의 관계를 분석하였다.

주제어: 행정통제, 부패, 좋은 거버넌스, 정책, 싱가포르

I. Introduction

The prevention of corruption is one of the most essential issues for attaining development in the contemporary world. The cost of corruption can be understood in three areas: political cost of affecting the rule of law, economic cost of depleting the national wealth, the social cost of undermining people's trust in the political system.

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Consequently, corruption impedes social, political, and economic development, which erodes the public trust, hurts economic investment, and undermines political democracy. Various policies for institutional, administrative, and societal reforms are necessary to combat corruption. The corruption can be regarded as the matter of governance system with structural and systemic problem. As corruption has been conceived as a symptom of governance failure, good governance means the lowest level of corruption in the power of the state. Corruption and good governance are antagonistic forces which operate in any developed or underdeveloped country. In order to introduce a strategic system of good governance, it is necessary to examine the meanings and methods of corruption. This paper explores the relationship between policy and anti-corruption as a crucial role in the fight against corruption, such as controls or sanctions. Also, as the matter of corruption is a central problem of economic and political development in Singapore, this paper will describe the context of good governance and anti-corruption strategies in the case of Singapore.

II. Theoretical Argument and Literature Review

1. The definition of corruption

It is necessary to mention that the classical principle of corruption is centered upon the moral vitality of society. For the scholars of structuralist, the term 'corruption' refers to the distribution of power in society rather than individual action in the relationship between leaders and followers (Johnston, 1996:322). Sometimes, the classical notion of corruption has become narrower while the field of politics in contemporary society has broadened. As a result, for most participants in political life, corruption refers to the actions of public officials (Johnston, 1996:322). However, in the contemporary literature on corruption, Heidenheimer (1989) explains "public-office centered, public-interest centered, and market-centered definitions of corruption".

First, in the view of the public office view, corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of public role because of private interest against the pursuit of public interest (Heidenheimer, 1989). The corrupt behaviors include bribery (the use of reward to pervert the judgments of a person); nepotism (patronage rather than merit

system); and misappropriation (an illegal appropriation of public resources for private profit) (Heidenheimer, 1989). Second, corruption emerges when a power-holder is motivated to undertake corrupt action by monetary or other illegal reward which does damage to the public interest (Heidenheimer, 1989). Third, market-centered corruption means that an officeholder will use his or her authority to obtain illegal income from the public, which refers to civil servants who treat their offices as a business, seeking to maximize their income (Heidenheimer, 1989).

2. The theoretical framework of corruption

Moralists consider that corruption is “an immoral and unethical phenomenon” which contains a set of moral aberrations from the moral standards of society. Moralists observe that corrupt practice “stems from the social norms that emphasize nepotism rather than the rule of law. However, the functionalists differ from the moralists in the view of corruption. Corruption plays an important role in the operation of the public sector. The cause of corruption is the matter of the political system and institution which is taken as the base for the analysis of corruption. The functionalists concur that the establishments of weak institution have generated corruption.

Corruption can be classified as grand, political, sporadic, systematic kind where it occurs. First, *systemic corruption* is deep-rooted and pervasive which happens in a routine manner within and between the companies, public sector establishments, or individuals. Second, *sporadic (individual) corruption* is the opposite of systemic corruption, where it occurs at times. Hence, there is no threat to the economy or mechanism for control in the type of corruption. Third, *political corruption* involves transactions between players in private and public sector where collective goods are channelized illegally for personal gains. Fourth, *Grand corruption* involves the act of corruption at a superior level of government. At the time of implementation of policy, high level or “grand” corruption takes place.

1) Corruption in economic context

The economic paradigm takes the principal-agent model of corruption. In the economic approach, the immoral role for achieving individual economic incentives and rewards in market activity can produce corrupt activities. Corruption is considered as

the outcome of individual illegal behavior and action for attaining expected costs and rewards, which is regarded as the formation of market failure. In this politics as a market approach, corruption can be defined within a principal-agent theoretical framework, identifying the conception of an abuse of entrusted power.

2) Corruption in political context

Political scientists advocate that an irrational political system can produce the high level of corruption. Public officials in government have excessive power which is handy in officials' rent-seeking. The lack of checks and monitoring in the political system has induced corruption. The lack of transparency in administration, the absence of accountability in politics, and the underdevelopment of civil society in society are identified as the causal factors in corruption. It is argued that the centralized structure of the political system was responsible for corruption, while corruption seemed to be a problem in local governments because of the process of decentralization.

3) Corruption in cultural context

The formation of culture like nepotism can be responsible for generating corruption. Organizational cultures, such as non-protestant culture, colonial heritage, Confucianism, and feudal values, are inclined to generate corruption. The importance of personal relationships seems to be ignoring the merit system in these cultures. In cultural tradition, the cultural norms and values shape the immoral preference and consideration of individuals in the social and institutional role.

3. The effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies and policies

In recent years, the governance capacities in the performance of governments have become a central concern in the field of public management. The strategic reforms of New Public Management (NPM) within The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations are regarded as policy to prevent corruption.

Corruption as a symptom of governance failure is a problem associated with governance because it is a symptom of fundamental institutional weakness. Lack of transparency and responsibility in the decision-making process, absence of the rule of

law, disrespect for human rights, and the misallocations of resources are the most important failed features of governance which leads to corruption.

According to the World Bank, characteristics of poor governance are: (a) no clear separation between public interest and private interest; (b) arbitrariness in the application of rules and laws; (c) excessive rules and regulations; (d) misallocations of resources; (e) lack of transparency and accountability in the process of policy decision. In a country where corruption is widespread, programs intended to tackle corruption should focus on eradicating the weaknesses of governance which cause corruption. Good governance shows clear decision-making procedures in the transparent and accountable institutions to prevent and combat corruption.

The fundamental failure of governance has produced corruption. Countries with high corruption have a low feature of governance. In a country with high corruption and a low quality of governance, it is required to establish the institutions of accountability based on the rule of law. A fundamental failure of governance should be changed by the reform of political system. Good governance shows transparency and accountability based on the rule of law which is the question of administrative procedure or institutional design. The good governance, including transparency based on the rule of law, embodies partnerships between state and society.

Characteristics of Good Governance: According to UNESCAP (2009), Good Governance has 8 major characteristics. These are as follows: ① Participation-citizens represents their opinions; ② The rule of Law-Judiciary functions impartially and human right laws are respected; ③ Consensus Oriented- Different interest groups find the means to reach a consensus regarding the best interests of the country; ④ Equity and Inclusiveness-All segments of the society, including minorities, should have opportunities to improve their welfare.; ⑤ Effectiveness and Efficiency-Public institutions meet the desired goals of development; ⑥ Accountability-All decision makers are answerable to the public and institutional stakeholder; ⑦ Transparency-Public should be able to access information regarding any decisions taken by state officials; ⑧ Responsiveness-Institutions and officials should consider the needs of all stakeholder in the present and future needs of society (UNESCAP, 2009).

In order to fight against corruption, establishing a national integrity system is crucial. The essential purpose of establishing a national integrity system is to prevent corruption. In detail, it is designed to prevent a systemic corruption. The primary emphasis is changing systems rather than blaming individuals. Strategies and policies

to combat corruption involve one or more of the eight following “pillars”: ① anti-corruption strategies in the public sector; ② “watchdog” agencies; ③ public participation in the democratic process; ④ public awareness of the role of civil society; ⑤ accountability of the judicial process; ⑥ the media; ⑦ the private sector and international business; ⑧ international co-operation (UNESCAP, 2009).

These pillars as interdependent relations is necessary to establish a national integrity system which requires the cooperative system of the government and civil society into a coherent framework of institutional system. In an integrated administrative system, the highest level of corrupt practices will be minimized. Therefore, reform in terms of public service procedures and systems is necessary to make the high level of accountability to the public interest. Also, fighting corruption requires the establishment of a clear ethical commitment and code. In addition, administrative reform for organizational change within the public service can minimize the opportunities for corrupt practices. It will be necessary to reduce the “monopoly power” of bureaucrats and to establish the institution for effective internal control to carry out anti-corruption functions. Anti-corruption agencies, the system of the ombudsman, and supreme audit institutions are considered as the “watchdog” role. Governments have sought to bolster the system of good governance by introducing independent anti-corruption agencies or commissions. An investigative unit with appropriate authority is necessary to ensure effective preventive steps as an anti-corruption agency based on political independence to investigate the highest level of government.

Corruption can be prevented by the system of external and internal control in the justice process. The illegally corrupt behavior and conduct of politicians and public officials have been analyzed in the process of political and economic development. Corrupt activities can destroy all types of governmental policies and programs, which potentially hinder development and negatively impact social capital (Doing, 1995: 152).

Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruklik in *“The Political Dimension of Corrupt Cleanups”* (1991:6) has suggested the measures of controlling corruption. First, societal strategies emphasize ethical norms and public vigilance. There is a general agreement that cleanup measure can not be effective if society as a whole does not accept and promote the standard of behavior based on fairness. Second, legal strategies based on legal codes prohibit corrupt activities. Legal sanctions can be effective in the presence of complementary strategies including increased penalties for corruption, the existence of independent auditing and investigative institutions, the existence of an independent

justice system in order to curb corruption (Gillespie and Okruklik, 1991:6). Third, market strategies are that corruption is enhanced by government intervention in the market. The strategy of government in order to clean up corruption is not successful. Fourth, political strategies promote the elimination of corrupt activities through the political process of administrative reforms. Finally, administrative reform emphasizes the discouragement of corrupt behavior by increasing the benefits of non-corrupt conduct (e.g. Increased salaries, pensions, training) and a mutual antagonistic surveillance between government agencies (Gillespie and Okruklik, 1991:8).

III. Case Study: Singapore

1. The strategy of anti-corruption

Singapore was “a member of the Financial Action Task Force” in 1992, “the founding members of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money-Laundering” in 1997, and “a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units” in 2002. In Singapore as a member of the Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, the means of effective policy can make a country as a role model in the world, which are taking policies against corruption and bribery.

The history of anti-corruption agencies starts in the early 1950s. As corruption is recognized as an important dysfunction of public administration in the 20th century (Meagher, 2005:70), Singapore created an anti-corruption agency as the new type of institution to combat the corruption.

The establishment of agency to control corruption through the means of investigation and prevention, which have increased the agency’s credibility with an impressive record of investigations and convictions (Heilbrunn, 2004:3-5). The political leaders decided to create the new agency for successful prosecutions. The activity of an anti-corruption agency as the essential function of an independent agency is to provide the core function of anti-corruption activity, which includes monitoring, investigation, and prosecution.

Also, in Singapore, a three-pronged reform program, involving the enforcement, legislation, and the judiciary, was launched in the early post-independence years. These reforms were not only sustained over the years, but also reinvigorated through

fresh initiatives periodically. Therefore, there are the ongoing efforts over a period of about 40 years. It is necessary that the laws provide the CPIB. In addition, the legislative reforms enhanced the law in the following aspects: ① The Public Prosecutor can order any other public officers or persons who may assist in the investigation of a public officer; ② Every person under investigation is legally obliged to provide information; ③ The Public Prosecutor can obtain information from the Comptroller of Income Tax under investigation; ④ Extra-territorial jurisdiction may be exercised against Singapore citizens committing corruption offense outside Singapore;

The Judiciary undertakes judicial reforms independently. Today, the Courts will practice a code of conduct, which they call the “Commandments”. These are ① Transparency in the selection and promotion of judges based on merit, competency in legal knowledge and experience; ② An independent accountable Judiciary. The Courts are free of any external interference in the judicial decision making process. At the same time, the Judiciary is subject to external audits to ensure accountability in the courts’ use of public resources; ③ A coherent system of case management, which eliminates backlog and shortens waiting time, rendering the Judiciary invulnerable to mismanagement of cases; ④ A Justices’ Scorecard for the Judiciary and the Judges which rigorously tracks performance measured through time-based, volume-based and disposal-based indicators; ⑤ Consistent and objective criteria in the administration of justice, including the establishment of a centralized sentencing court, standardized composition fees and fines, and the application of tariffs in sentencing, etc; ⑥ Clear ethical markers and guidelines for the Judges; ⑦ Transparency in the justice process as all court proceedings is required.

The judiciary is intent on creating a regime of punishment. The reforms ensure effectiveness in enforcement, legislation and adjudication. The effective enforcement, legislation, and adjudication form of corruption control in Singapore with political will can provide the effective administration. The reform programs were driven top-down by the Government, spurred on by an intense political will. Corruption-control in Singapore is a state-imperative. The entire civil service executed the reforms through the steersman ship of the Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee formed in 1973 and disbanded in 1975 after its initial tasks were completed. The Government provides immense moral authority for the anti-corruption movement, which is largely instrumental in sustaining the entire anti-corruption program.

As the political will is the cornerstone of any anti-corruption movement which is the

commitment of actors to undertake actions to reduce corruption. The strong political will is necessary to generate the state-sponsored endeavor of the anti-corruption movement. Singapore's success in minimizing corruption can be demonstrated to the dual strategy of decreasing both the opportunities and incentives for corruption.

In Singapore, the political leadership must be committed to the eradication of corruption, which must demonstrate exemplary conduct and adopt a moral lifestyle. To combat corruption, comprehensive anti-corruption measures must be adopted. An effective anti-corruption strategy is comprehensive anti-corruption laws with the function of a non-corrupt and autonomous anti-corruption agency. The anti-corruption agency (ACA) must be incorruptible. It must be controlled or supervised by an incorruptible political leader. To reduce the opportunities for corruption in the departments of government including the field of traffic police, immigration, internal revenue, and custom which are vulnerable to corrupt activities. The departments must review their procedures periodically in order to decrease the opportunities for corruption. Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are specialized organizations formed by governments to minimize corruption.

The incentive for corruption among civil servants and political leaders can be reduced by ensuring that their salaries and fringe benefits are competitive with the private sector, but governments might not be able to increase salaries unless there is economic growth and adequate financial resources; the long-term consequences of low civil service salaries are unfavorable, as talented civil servants will leave to join private companies for higher pay, while the less capable civil servants will remain and succumb to corruption to supplement their low salaries (Quah, 2002). Ensuring living wages are crucial to efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. In an anti-corruption strategy with fair salary structures, public service salaries in Singapore are the highest in the world.

There are many factors, which lead to corruption. Weak governance can be regarded as the fundamental causes of corruption. Centralization of power and lack of political competition are major factors in emerging corruption within a country. The State should establish the anti-corruption agency of autonomy in order to eradicate corruption. A notable feature of the government bureaucracy in Singapore has been the lack of corruption; since its independence in 1959, Singapore has stood out in successfully combating the corruption within politics and administration, which it inherited from the colonial period (Venu Menon, 2007:8). The first important step was

the enactment of comprehensive anti-corruption legislation in 1960, in the form of the Prevention of Corruption Act period (Venu Menon, 2007:8). The legislation has been made even more stringent and comprehensive through a subsequent amendment period (Venu Menon, 2007:8). Under one of the amendments, a bribery offense can be committed even if no bribe was actually taken, so long as the intention to do so is proven period (Venu Menon, 2007:8). In addition, the policy of paying civil servants and employees adequately is the major force to combat corruption as it sought to reduce the temptation to take bribes or extort and embezzle money (Venu Menon, 2007:8).

Singapore becomes a successful country through the system of fairness. In Singapore, value in terms of rule of law index, government effectiveness index, control of corruption, regulatory quality index, voice and accountability index, political stability index, corruption perceptions Index, political rights index, civil liberties index, and women in parliament may be summarized as follows.

First, value about rule of law index is 1.82 in 2017 (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong): for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Singapore during that period was 1.61 points with a minimum of 1.24 points in 1996 and a maximum of 1.83 points in 2016 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Second, value about government effectiveness index is 2.21 in 2017 (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong): for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Singapore during that period was 2.15 points with a minimum of 1.85 points in 2002 and a maximum of 2.44 points in 2008 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Third, value about Control of corruption is 2.13 in 2017 (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong): for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Singapore during that period was 2.17 points with a minimum of 2.07 points in 2014 and a maximum of 2.33 points in 2004 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Fourth, value about regulatory quality index is 2.12 in 2017 (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong): for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Singapore during that period was 1.97 points with a minimum of 1.75 points in 2005 and a maximum of 2.26 points in 2015 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Fifth, value about voice and accountability index is -0.17 in 2017 (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong): for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Singapore during that period was -0.08 points with a minimum of -0.39 points in 2006 and a maximum of 0.14 points in 1996 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Sixth, value about political stability index is 1.59 (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong): for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Singapore during that period was 1.22 points with a minimum of 0.88 points in 2003 and a maximum of 1.59 points in 2017 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Seventh, value about Corruption Perceptions Index is 84 in 2016, 100 = no corruption: for that indicator, Transparency International provides data for Singapore from 2001 to 2016. The average value for Singapore during that period was 91 points with a minimum of 84 points in 2014 and a maximum of 94 points in 2003 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Eighth, value about the political rights index is 4 in 2019, 7 (weak) – 1 (strong): for that indicator, The Freedom House provides data for Singapore from 1972 to 2019. The average value for Singapore during that period was 5 points with a minimum of 4 points in 1981 and a maximum of 5 points in 1972 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Ninth, value about the civil liberties index is 4 in 2019, 7 (weak) – 1 (strong): for that indicator, The Freedom House provides data for Singapore from 1972 to 2019. The average value for Singapore during that period was 5 points with a minimum of 4 points in 1989 and a maximum of 5 points in 1972 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

Tenth, value about women in parliament is 23% in 2018, percent: for that indicator, The World Bank provides data for Singapore from 1990 to 2018. The average value for Singapore during that period was 17.45 percent with a minimum of 4.3 percent in 1999 and a maximum of 25.3 percent in 2014 (The Global Economy, 2019 & World Bank, 2018).

2. The function of PAP(People's Action Party) and CPIB(Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau)

The People's Action Party (PAP) government's in Singapore has minimized

corruption because of the three important policies: ① Strong political will: ② the function the CPIB to enforce: ③ Impartial enforcement of the POCA(the Prevention of Corruption Act). According to the law, the effective anti-corruption policy is performed which are punished to the Corruption offenders in Singapore. From 2008 to 2014, the CPIB's personnel and budget have been increased for reflecting the strong political desire by the PAP governments.

Singapore's experience confirms the importance of punishing the guilty of corruption offenses, regardless of their status, position or political affiliation, in order to deter others from engaging in corrupt activities. During the British colonial period, corruption was a "low risk, high reward" activity as the probability of being detected and punished for corruption offenses was low because of the ACB's ineffectiveness (Quah, 2007: 14-15).

However, Singapore's activity in corruption can be considered as a "high risk, low reward" because those persons convicted of corruption offenses are punished according to the law. In PERC's corruption survey, Singapore was the first ranked among the 12 Asian countries in which attributed Singapore's top ranking to its strict and consistent enforcement of anti-corruption laws (Straits Times, 1996: 3). Similarly, eight senior civil servants were investigated by the CPIB and the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) from 1991 to 2014¹⁾ (Quah, 2015a: 81).

The CPIB's impartial enforcement of the POCA means that, unlike the governments in some Asian countries, the PAP government has not used corruption allegations as a

1) First, Glenn Knight, the CAD's Director, was sentenced to three month's jail in 1991 for attempted cheating and giving false information for a government car loan; Second, Yeo Seng Teck, Chief Executive Officer of the Trade Development Board, was found guilty of cheating and forgery involving US\$2 million worth of Chinese antiques and sentenced to four years' imprisonment in 1993; Third, Choy Hon Tin, Deputy Chief Executive (Operations) of Public Utilities Board, was found guilty in 1995 of accepting bribes from contractors and sentenced to 14 years' jail and ordered to pay back S\$13.85 million; Fourth, Koh Seah Wee, a Deputy Director at the Singapore Land Authority, was found guilty of cheating and money laundering offenses amounting to S\$12.5 million and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment in November 2011; Fifth, Ng Boon Gay, Director of the Central Narcotics Bureau, was accused in June 2012 of corruptly obtaining sexual favors from a female sales manager; Sixth, Peter Lim, Director of the Singapore Civil Defence Force, was found guilty of receiving sexual favors from three female executives and sentenced to six months' imprisonment in June 2013; Seventh, Edwin Yeo, a CPIB Assistant Director, was found guilty of misappropriating S\$1.76 million from 2008 to 2012 and sentenced to ten years' jail in February 2014; Finally, Lim Cheng Hoe, Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was found guilty of cheating the government of S\$88,997 and sentenced to 15 months' jail in February 2014 (Quah, 2015a: 81).

weapon against its political opponents; “corruption has been increasingly politicized” in Cambodia, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand, where politicians use “accusations of corruption” to discredit their rivals and to remove them from the political playing field (Asian Intelligence, 2014:1-2).

Singapore’s leadership and government made a strategic policy of export oriented-free market economy based on the formation of “developmental state” controlled and regulated by state. In the unique context of Singapore, the state and its bureaucracy became the leading actor to generate economic growth and foster the process of industrialization.

Value about Property rights index is 98 in 2018(0-100): for that indicator, the Heritage Foundation provides data for Singapore from 1995 to 2019. The average value for Singapore during that period was 91 points with a minimum of 90 points in 1995 and a maximum of 98 points in 2018 (The Global Economy, 20198 & World Bank, 2018). In addition, value about Business freedom index is 91 in 2018(0-100): for that indicator, the Heritage Foundation provides data for Singapore from 1995 to 2019. The average value for Singapore during that period was 98 points with a minimum of 91 points in 2018 and a maximum of 100 points in 1995 (The Global Economy, 20198 & World Bank, 2018). Consequently, value about overall economic freedom index is 89 in 2018(0-100): for that indicator, the Heritage Foundation provides data for Singapore from 1995 to 2019. The average value for Singapore during that period was 88 index points with a minimum of 86 index points in 1995 and a maximum of 89 index points in 2004 (The Global Economy, 20198 & World Bank, 2018).

In case of Singapore, the role of the leadership would be crucial to attain the economic and social development with the political function of People’s Action Party (PAP) based on an application of the principles of developmental administration which could be the application of the administrative values of effectiveness and efficiency, justice, and morality, and Lee’s leading ideology of Asian values which have underlined the role of strong state is a form of ruling doctrine, seen as creating the society of anti-corruption (Yun, 2010 & Yun, 2013:14-15).

As Yun (2010) has described, the PAP not only controls the Army, the Judiciary, the Union Movement and the Police Force (Buchanan, 1972 & Yun, 2013:14-15). Between 1968 and October 1981, in four national parliamentary elections, the PAP won every seat, and the December 1980 general elections witnessed a PAP win in all 75 parliamentary seats and 75.5 per cent of ballots cast in those 38 constituencies where

opposition candidates ran (Bellows, 1985:56 & Yun, 2013:14-15).

The development is achieved by the rule of law with the mechanism of checks and balances based on institutional democracy in advanced countries as the politics-administration dichotomy, while the economic growth can be attained by the effective governance of bureaucracy as the integration between politics and administration rather than the politics-administration dichotomy in the developing countries, such as the case of Singapore (Yun, 2018:154).

The government of Singapore has induced the formation of strong state through the developmental successful administration by promoting ethics in government and by forming civic culture in people. The biggest difference between enterprise and government is that the former is driven by the bottom line—the need to be profitable—while the latter operates on fixed budgets with regulatory measures of effectiveness; “the propensity for corruption and unethical behavior increases as organization and structure moves from governmental model to the enterprise model”, and “the propensity for corruption and unethical behavior increases as the preponderance of individuals in an organization moves from the civically to the privately inclined”(Frederickson, 1997:178-179 & Yun, 2012:249-250). As organization and structure is governmental model and personal inclination is civic, Singapore becomes a country of successful integrity.

〈Table 1〉 The Effects of Personal Inclinations and Organization and Structure on Corruption and Ethics in Government

Personal Inclinations Organization and Structure	Civic	Private
Government	Likely to be least corrupt, most ethical	Likely to experience some corruption and unethical behavior, but within government
Enterprise	As distance from government increases, changes for corruption and unethical behavior increase	Most likely to experience corruption and unethical behavior due to a lack of controls

Source: Frederickson, 1997:180 & Yun, 2012:250

Yun (2010) has argued that Singapore can be seen as the foundations of administrative state which may be seen as a form of state corporatism with the

reciprocal relations between government and citizen (Yun, 2013:14-15). Singapore's governance notion is not the individual liberty of the citizens, but "a community of solidarity", which is to perform public good and interest by the principle of integrity and anti-corruption based on civic culture (Yun, 2013:14-15). A political conflict would be an obstacle to the function and role of autonomous state which has substantially induced the strategy of the developmental administration in order to achieve the process of economic development for common good (Yun, 2013:14-15). The formation of good governance would be a strategy for the interest of whole citizens with the high level of state's autonomy and society's support, which is accountability and integrity in the role of government as justice and morality in encouraging public interest (Yun, 2013:14-15). The 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows that Singapore scored 84 out of 100 and ranked 6th among 174 countries, which is perceived as a very clean country.

As Yun (2010) has explained, the political value of the policy would essentially be a distributive justice with the enforcement of law which is required to prevent bureaucratic corruptibility (Yun, 2013:14-15). The doctrine of ethical governance is associational notion rather than a political one mentioned by John Rawls which means the norm of friendship, trust, faith, charity, and humanity in the society of Singapore (Yun, 2013:14-15). Singapore's limited democracy may not fully conform to accepted democratic norms and values, but it is difficult to deny that the system has worked extremely well and has produced a remarkable national development (Vasil, 2000:249; see also Yun, 2010 & Yun, 2013:14-15). The political governance in Singapore had contributed to "economic development, social prosperity, and ethnic cooperation" for inducing social development (Yun, 2013:14-15). A sense of community, strong ethical values, and social solidarity, which are associated with the doctrine of successful developmental administration, are performed by the government of Singapore (Yun, 2013:14-15). The value of policy can be seen to consist of inner moral strength, magnanimity, vitality, generosity, public spirit, civic sense, which is to establish the moral community society under the higher autonomy of state and to perform common interest for social development under the strategy of the developmental administration (Yun, 2013:14-15).

The success of the developmental administration is performed by internal institutional control strategy rather than external institutional control strategy in Singapore. External institutional control strategies are examples of administrative

control by the National Assembly, judiciary, civic groups, ombudsman, media, and political parties. Internal institutional control strategies are cases of administrative control through audit departments, the Board of Audit and Inspection, the Cabinet Coordination Office, the senior secretary for civil affairs, senior administrative control, and audit function of ministries. Also, internal behavioral control strategies are the case of a formation of rational administrative culture, while external behavioral control strategies are an illustration of civic culture.

〈Table 2〉 Administration Control

	control by institution	Control by change of consciousness and behavior
external control	external institutional control	external behavioral control
Internal control	internal institutional control	internal behavioral control

It is usual to mention that external and internal behavioral control strategy rather than external and internal institutional control strategy requires longer time and period to make the effective control system. In the case of Singapore, internal institutional control strategies such as the function of CPIB((Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau) may be perceived as an effective strategy during the short period. Clean politics can, in fact, be promoted by the role of intensive, selective, and strategic administration control in Singapore. Consequently, the strategy to strength the internal institutional administration control would essentially be crucial to improve the level of CPI in Singapore.

IV. Conclusion

This paper explores the relationship between policy and anti-corruption as a crucial role to prevent corruption, such as controls or sanctions. This article represents that the policy is very useful and effective in combating corruption. The use of institutional policy can provide governmental actions as the strategy of anti-corruption. The research conducted in Singapore shows that it is possible to implement a policy effectively. The combination of various policies can create a suitable scenario for

collaboration against corruption. It is to provide a view on how making an effective policy can be used for anti-corruption purposes. Singapore's experience in curbing corruption indicates that it is possible to minimize corruption if there is the strategy of effective internal institutional control with a strong political will.

Corruption is regarded as one of the most important drawbacks to development. The theoretical literature represents that corruption is negatively correlated with economic and political development. The matter of corruption is a central problem of economic and political development in Singapore. The theoretical literature defines the kind of corruption and explain the pattern of the corrupt phenomenon. It is significant to recognize both the determinants of corruption and the effects in politics and society. Corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework because it is a symptom of fundamental institutional weakness. As corruption has been conceived as a symptom of governance failure, good governance involves the lowest level of corruption in the management and operation of the state. The rule of law, transparency, and accountability are important factors in administrative procedure or institutional design, which is an outcome of democratization provided by internal and external institutional control strategy. The processes are sustained by legitimate and effective institutions. In order to fight against corruption, a national integrity system is an important factor. Monitoring systems provided by the internal institutional control strategy in Singapore are necessary to reduce corruption which represents an important step in generating transparency and accountability in government.

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<Abstract>

An Effective Governance for Development based on the Strategy of Anti-corruption in Singapore

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The matter of corruption is a central problem of economic and political development in Singapore. The prevention of corruption is one of the most fundamental issues for accomplishing development. Corruption impedes social, cultural, political, and economic development, which erodes economic development and undermines political democracy. The strategy of internal control in the administration control is successful to combat corruption in Singapore. As corruption has been conceived as a symptom of governance failure, the strategy of effective administrative control including external and internal control is, as a matter of fact, required. In order to introduce a strategic system of good governance, it is necessary to examine the strategy of internal control in Singapore. This paper explores the relationship between policy and anti-corruption to prevent corruption, such as controls or sanctions. This paper will describe the context of good governance and anti-corruption strategies in the case of Singapore.

Key words: Administration Control, Corruption, Good Governance, Policy, Singapore