

Corruption and Underdevelopment in Tanzania and Kenya

케냐와 탄자니아의 부패와 저발전

Yun, Eun Gee(윤 은 기)*

ABSTRACT

본 논문의 주요한 연구의 목적은 저발전의 원인의 분석과 함께 발전의 과정과 전략을 고찰해 보는 것이다. 케냐와 탄자니아의 발전전략에서 발전행정의 이론과 개념의 적용이 상이하지만 근본적인 저발전의 원인은 부패로부터 기인하였다는 점을 논의 하였다. 2007년 국제투명성 기구 발표 부패인식지수에서 케냐는 부패지수 2.1로 150위와 탄자니아는 부패지수 3.2로 94위의 부패적인 국가로써 간주되고 있다. 두 국가의 발전전략의 목적, 내용, 과정 등을 논의하고 이성적인 관료와 국가의 역할과 기능에 근거한 자유주의 발전 전략의 필요성을 분석하였다.

Key words : corruption(부패), underdevelopment(저발전), developmental strategy(발전 전략)

I. Introduction

Tanzania and Kenya had stressed rural development because most of the population lived in rural areas(Leonard, 1991). Without rural development, the rapidly growing population in Tanzania and Kenya would cause a serious economic crisis. Accordingly, rural development would be crucial and decisive in Tanzania and Kenya. The pattern of rural development was shaped by the demand of the economic development of political elite. The rural development can lead to economic development in three major ways. First, the success of the agricultural sector can increase food supply. Second, the exports of agricultural products can obtain necessary foreign exchange for investment in industry. Third, the rise in peasant's income can amplify the size of the domestic market for manufacturing sectors.

The role of political agents is a substantial factor for generating development. To induce effective economic growth and property, political agents should, to a great

* 동아대학교 행정학과 교수

extent, focus on the analysis of rational bureaucratic system with the capitalistic developmental strategy. The achievement of development will depend on the capacity of the political agents of bureaucrats. Therefore, the rational response of bureaucracy is necessarily required for producing a strategy for development. Economic growth attained by an independent state has been identified as a prerequisite for democracy. Consequently, the process of development will depend on the ability of each state and the effectiveness of bureaucracy. Ultimately, it will be argued that political agents, including state, bureaucracy, organization and people, may induce development.

II. A failure of Developmental Strategy

In the case of Tanzania, the pattern of rural development was based on the economic system of self-reliant socialism. During the post-independence period, the plan of agricultural mechanization, the scheme of village settlement, and the collectivism of the peasant community were emphasized. Moreover, in the post-Arusha declaration era, the policy of rural development was more centralized socialism, based on Ujamaa village models. The purpose of Ujamaa was to generate equality, freedom, and unity with a gradual socialist transformation of society. However, the Ujamaa program was not successful.

Several factors contributed to the failure of the Ujamaa program. First, a revolutionary socialist program of the Ujamaa program required a political ideology for successful performance, such as the consciousness of class. However, the community in Tanzania was not based on the concept of class, but on a sort of co-operative concept. Accordingly, in the absence of a political ideology, the government was unable to mobilize peasant community. As a result, the absence of political ideology in peasant community undermined the unity of the peasant community.

Secondly, material benefits of participating in Ujamaa community were absent. In the peasantly view, material benefits were lacking because government took surpluses from agricultural output by manipulating prices and taxes. Therefore, an ideology of socialism without material incentives led to the increase of the distrust in terms of the function of the government.

Thirdly, the plan of Ujamaa was performed by authoritarian bureaucracy which undermined the incentive of local participation. Accordingly, the Tanzanian approach

to authoritarian socialism discouraged the private motivation of peasants, induced the inefficiency of bureaucracy, and led to the distrust of peasant about the role of government. Thus, the policies of rural development, such as enforced villagization, the centralization of economic decision-making, and the nationalization of major enterprise, eroded political legitimacy, destroyed mass incentives, and delayed industrialization(Yeager, 1989: 147).

Nyerere's political thought was a key factor shaping the pattern of rural development. His political ideology was the consensual, organic, and authoritarian notions of Jean-Jacque Rousseau rather than the competitive and contractual models of John Locke and other philosophical pragmatists(Yeager, 1989:31). Thus, private interests were subordinated to common goals for his political thought(Yeager, 1989:33). After independence, Nyerere's philosophy stressed nonalignment in the foreign policy and self-reliance in rural development policy.

However, the Nyerere's ideology caused underdevelopment for several reasons. First, the conceptions of self-reliance led to poor technologies because of the rejection of foreign skill, technology, and capital which perpetuated the low levels of living.

Second, a socialist idea of Nyerere was not appropriate in Tanzania. Aspects of the cultural identity of the peasantry, such as polygamy, gerontocracy, funeral feasts, and the economy of affection, were the main obstruction to socialist transformation. Besides, Tanzanian societies were static with the present of traditional religious, culture, and society. The immorality of vice, corruption, and depravity was prevailing in Tanzanian societies. Thus, the non-humanitarian culture of the masses was not appropriate for the adoption of Nyerere's idea.

Third, Nyerere was to construct a democratic society of inequality, elitism, and political instability. Although Nyerere suggested democratic political ideas, the role of the government of Tanzania was authoritarian in the performance of policies. The government's bureaucratic inclinations led to a massive state apparatus over society, an excessive administrative authority, an expression of authoritarian elitism, and a progressive elimination of local participation in the framing of rural development programs(Yeager, 1989:86).

In sum, rural development was not achieved on the basis of self-reliance based on command economy, the non-humanitarian culture of masses, and the coercive authority of authoritarian government. Although modern Tanzania attained social achievement in health care and literary programs, Tanzania suffers from poverty, dependency, and corruption. The Tanzanian experiment was a model of social

achievement in education and health care, compared with Kenya. However, it was also a lesson in developmental failure in terms of Tanzania's economic and political development.

Accordingly, the government of Ali Hassan Mwinyi had altered the socialist economic policies. The government had decreased its control over economy, admitted private businesses, and reduced state-owned operations, requested more foreign aid, and emphasized export earnings. The international Monetary Fund(IMF) was regarded as a necessary mean to achieve rural development in the era of Mwinyi, while the IMF was considered as an inappropriate mean for rural development in the era of Nyerere. Tanzania had accepted international capitalist system with the accommodation of international finance, as the basis for trying to promote rural development. Thus, the future of Tanzania would be determined by the state's willingness to decentralize its power, to support a free market rather than a command economy, and to reduce international dependency in the process(Yeager, 1989:152).

In the case of Kenya, the pattern of rural development was a capitalistic developmental strategy. Under Kenyatta's regime, Kenya adopted a capitalist economic system with the allowance of private-enterprise, the accommodation of foreign capital, and the existence of multinational corporations; a large proportion of development expenditure was financed by foreign capital, capital for new industries was provided by foreign investors, and multinational corporations were increased by the augmentation of foreign investment. In short, the economic system of Kenya was dominated by foreign investment with the cooperation of local petty-bourgeoisie and auxiliary bourgeoisie.

In this capitalistic developmental strategy, underdevelopment began with colonialism and continued under neo-colonialism in Kenya(Leys, 1975:271). The monopolies of the capital of comprador class after independence were growing in Kenya, as did European settlers in the colonial period. The economic system of Kenya did not engender rural development due to three problems.

First, auxiliary bourgeoisie in multinational corporations and petty bourgeoisie of merchants and farmers had accumulated capital which was not invested in rural development. In other words, the surplus generated from agriculture was invested in the local non-agricultural sector or abroad. Hence, domestic investment was allocated to non-agriculture sector rather than agriculture. Consequently, the areas of research for rural development, including linguistics, medicine, botany, zoology, climate, animal husbandry, etc, were neglected(Chambers, 1990:146).

Second, the power of state was controlled by the power of foreign capital due to the possession of more capital, resource, and technology in multinational corporations, compared with the capacity of capital and technology of Kenyan state. Accordingly, the establishment of strong domestic bourgeoisie above foreign capital was not supported by the Kenya state. As a result, the domination and interest of domestic and national bourgeoisie for rural development was weak.

Third, the dependent elite had resisted land reform because most lands were owned by dependent government officials or wealthy businessmen. Therefore, land reform was resisted by the dependent elite because it was a sensitive political issue in Kenya.

In a word, with the resistance of land reform, capital accumulation formed by the comprador class rather than national bourgeoisie resulted in the shortage of investment in the rural area or field. Consequently, the increase of foreign capital led to the increase of multinational corporations, the multinational corporations were supported by the dependent bourgeoisie, and the dependent bourgeoisie did not invest its accumulated capital in rural areas. Accordingly, the classes related to foreign capital performed capital accumulation not for Kenya's people in rural area but for their interest in urban areas. Although the policy led to the rapid development of Kenya's economy at the expense of great inequalities of wealth and opportunity, usually Kenyan capitalistic system limited rural underdevelopment. In short, an irrational policy of government was a major factor in the failure of rural development, as the characteristic of the Kenya's political economy.

In Tanzania and Kenya, a key factor that shaped the pattern of rural development in Kenya was market-economy system, while that in Tanzania was self-reliant socialistic system. According to the capitalistic developmental theory, rural development can be reached by capital accumulation, investments, and technical improvements. On the other hand, for socialistic developmental theory, it is discussed that rural development may be attained by the power of organization with an ideology of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and nationalism.

However, in the experiment of Tanzania, self-reliance economy system in Tanzania was a failure due to the absence of effective peasant's mobilization and the poor technologies of self-reliant system. The conceptions of self-reliance led to the rejection of advanced foreign skill, technology and capital, which caused poor technologies. The adoption of dependency theory for the strategy of development led to an isolation of world economic system which the final result was underdevelopment. After all, the socialist system of self-reliance, based on the

accommodation of dependency theory, is impractical in trying to achieve rural development.

In the analysis of Kenya, dependency theories had overemphasized the influence of international economic system on the domestic areas; the underdevelopment process of Kenya was fundamentally dependent upon the variations of capitalist world economy because of the weakness of the state in Kenya in relation to the world economic system. However, a failure of market-economy system in Kenya was not because of foreign capital but due to the dominance of dependent bourgeoisie over the national interest of rural development. In other words, the capital accumulation attained by dependent bourgeoisie did not invest largely for rural development. Thus, domestic capital accumulations for investments and technical improvements in the rural areas was not enough. Consequently, underdeveloped Kenya was characterized by the monopoly of company, low productivity, and corruption. Accordingly, the process of rural development based on the effective investment of foreign capital was not successful.

After all, a change of ideology in Tanzania and Kenya was required. Any ideology is not dogmatic but flexible; ideology is changing and developing. The theory of socialism was developing in Tanzania, while the ideology of capitalism was advancing in Kenya. Developing socialism must be the adoption of market system in Tanzania, while advancing capitalism should be the reduction of monopoly benefits of the dependent bourgeoisie, the appearance of national bourgeoisie, and the investment of accumulated capital in the rural areas in Kenya. In short, the fundamental requirement for a successful economy may be the adoption of market systems with the exclusion of the monopoly benefit of dependent bourgeoisie, and the growth of national bourgeoisie, and the system of rational bureaucracy.

In addition, key factors for underdevelopment in both Tanzania and Kenya were the primitive mode of peasant production, the mistaken policies, the corruption of bureaucracy, the ignorance of the role of state in the process of rural development.

First, the failure of the rural development was due to the primitive mode of peasant production, which involved the scale of the small peasant as self sufficient units, the existence of traditional society with a great autonomy of peasantry, and 'uncaptured peasant' by other social class in Hyden's view. In Tanzania and Kenya, peasants maintained the autonomy of peasantry, kept the 'economy of affection', and resisted the creation of national market. Therefore, the autonomy, 'the economy of affection', and absence of a national market were the principal

obstacles to create national market and to generate surplus. The creation of national market can produce surplus which may lead to rural development. In Tanzania, little achievement in mass education and health care was due to the consequence of the surplus from agriculture.

Also, in the West, development was achieved by the elimination of feudalism and the production of surplus. In Eastern Europe and China, rural development was attained by a socialist corporation system with the outcome of surplus. Hence, a change of primitive production mode is required to bring about surplus in Tanzania and Kenya.

Second, in the development policy of Tanzania and Kenya, the failure of rural development policy was partly due to the lack of information and perception in regard to rural area. The nature of poverty was misperceived by the short observation of outsiders such as academics, students, researchers, and etc. Hence, the choices of policy for rural development were sometimes mistaken, such as a wrong investment, ineligible strategy, and forced policy. In a world wide pattern of Chambers view, the real nature of poverty could not be realized by the professional travel in the dry season on the tarmac roads in study vehicles to meet in accessible villages people with the manner of politeness and timidity (Chambers, 1990:13-23). Consequently, urbanised professionals who study, plan, and programme rural development had failed to recognize the real nature of rural poverty. Accordingly, the rural poor could be scanned in misleading surveys, smoothed out in statistical averages, and moulded into stereotypes (Chambers, 1990:106).

Third, the form of the dominant culture of the family, kinship, and man systems in Tanzania and Kenya was an authoritarian culture. Women were the majority of producers. However, it would be acknowledged that women were absent from the positions of power, men used the state to control women and advance their own interests, and women farmers' opinions in bureaucratic and political processes were ignored. Accordingly, the cultural misunderstanding and non-humanitarian culture led to the failure of rural development (Staudt, 1991:44).

Fourth, a part success for rural development was achieved by the reasonable bureaucracy of specific individuals in Leonard's view. In other words, personal lives and the professional activities of four men had contributed to the part success of rural development in Kenya. Hence, the Leonard's primary emphasis of the Kenyan bureaucracy was control and stability on spreading the authority and legitimacy of the regime. However, on bureaucracy, the analysis of Leonard was not about entire bureaucracy but specific individuals. The anti-rationalization, anti-efficiency, and

corruption of the bureaucracy in Kenya brought about underdevelopment. As a whole, the Kenyan and Tanzanian bureaucracy was a sense of corruption. Hence, the bureaucratic socialism of Tanzania and the bureaucratic capitalism of Kenya was not a rational bureaucratization of efficiency, precision, and discretion. Thus, a failure of reasonable bureaucratic performance in the districts and regions was a factor in the failure of rural development programs and efforts.

According to the annual survey by the Berlin-based organization Transparency International, Finland, Denmark and New Zealand are perceived to be the world's least corrupt countries, and Tanzania and Kenya are perceived to be the most corrupt.

The 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index

country rank	country	2007 CPI Score
1	Finland, Denmark, New Zealand	9.4
9	Canada, Norway	8.7
17	Japan, Ireland	7.5
25	Spain, Uruguay	6.7
34	Macao, Taiwan United Arab Emirates	5.7
94	Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Panama, Madagascar	3.2
150	Kenya, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ecuador, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh,	2.1

Source: Transparency International, 2007.

III. The function of Bureaucracy and State for Development

Bureaucracy is regarded as the prime agency of development. Reasonable bureaucratic structure and characteristic of state can induce rural development. Its function is to increase the levels of operational efficiency, effectiveness, horizontal coordination, flexibility, and innovation. The rational bureaucratic dominance will be legal, because bureaucratic function keeps efficiency, induces order, and makes right

decision for development. Then, the rational bureaucratization of the political and economic sphere of society can lead to rural development. Accordingly, underdevelopment is not a natural phenomenon but man-made one. Development is in people's hands, for people make decisions and contribute labor (Staudt, 1991:24). Thus, development is inherently political: progressive change requires political strategizing along with wider empowerment (Staudt, 1991:271). A starting point in development involves understanding the political structure, process, and relationship (Staudt, 1991:67). Hence, progressive politics can produce reform. New solutions to resolve the above mentioned four factors causing underdevelopment can be performed by the political decisions of state.

The states of Kenya and Tanzania had adopted development strategies for rural development which played the roles of planning, capital formation, investments, financing, and coordination. The two states played a key role in rural development by formulating and implementing its own development goals. If the state has coincident interests with major societal actors, such as local business, farmers, intellectuals, etc, it can easily perform its strategy, if not, the state will represent more social interests of certain social groups rather than a comprehensive national interest. Where the state is weak, as a whole, societal actors can be strong. On the other hand, when she is strong, they may be weak. While the strong state without adequate capacity for rural development can act as an authoritarian regime, the capable state has the ability to operate as a corporate actor using effective state interventions,

Relation between state autonomy and societal support

	state autonomy-high	state autonomy-low
societal support-high	strong state	responsive state
societal support-low	independent state	weak state

Source: E. Nordlinger, 1981.

In Tanzania, the state is strong and autonomous, unlike Kenya. However, strong and autonomous state does not always have high capacity for rural development, as did Tanzania. The coercive policy of Tanzania with low state's capacity, like Ujamaa, could not destroy the primitive mode of peasant production, control peasant's community, and create national market. In the experiment of Tanzania, as the capacity of state was lower, the state had used repressive measure. As the state adopted an increasingly coercive policy, the peasant's resistance had grown

stronger.

In Kenya, the power of state was controlled by the dependent bourgeoisie. In other words, as the state had low capacity, its structure was reorganized according to the interests of dominant dependent bourgeoisie rather than that of the states. As the state was weak, state action was a reflection of the interests of dependent bourgeoisie. Hence, the state of Kenya should acquire a certain degree of relative autonomy from the dominant bourgeoisie class, support local business rather than multinationals in the accumulation process, and promote the growth of national bourgeoisie. In short, the state's interest for rural development was impeded by the interest of dependent bourgeoisie.

Two countries, in general, had two different streams: liberalist and socialist. Socialistic theory might not be applicable to the rural development. If so, one choice of two theories, liberal elitist theory or pluralist theory, may be necessary for the strategy of rural development. In the choice of theory for rural development, a elitist theory can be an appropriate method. The presence of weak social classes, the tendency of traditionally strong authoritarian regimes, and the phenomenon of non individualistic culture in Kenya and Tanzania, unlike the characteristics of Western countries, accentuates the need of the elitist theory rather than the pluralist theory. In other words, rural development can be achieved by the strong policy performance of political elites in the condition of the political, cultural, and social situation of Tanzania and Kenya.

In conclusion, the main key factors shaping the pattern of rural development are policies based on ideology, the function of political leaders, the culture, and the role of bureaucracy. First, ideology for the pattern of rural development was based on socialism in Tanzania and capitalism in Kenya. As a whole, the pattern of rural development was a socialistic developmental strategy for Tanzania, while one of rural development was a capitalistic developmental plan for Kenya. However, the socialist reform in Tanzania led to a failure in economic development, while the capitalist method in Kenya was not successful because of the phenomena of serious corruption.

As a result, rural development is not performed by socialism, based on self-reliance. The socialistic developmental strategy is not practical but an ideal. Thus, a new pattern of rural development is not against the market system of capitalism. The social market system needs state function to reduce the negative factors, such as inflation, unemployment, and the domination of dependent bourgeoisie.

Accordingly, the rural development is based on the pattern of capitalistic developmental strategy. However, the form of this developmental strategy is not that of the Kenyan capitalistic developmental strategy. In other words, rural development can not be accompanied by the irrational bureaucracy derived from corruption. The form of capitalism for rural development must be a fair competition in market system and an income distribution through the investment of accumulated capital in the rural areas. Therefore, capitalistic developmental strategy can induce rural development, if a fair competition in market system and the rationalization of bureaucracy exist. However, capitalistic developmental strategy can not bring about rural development, if the absence of fair competition in market system, the existence of the dependent bourgeoisie, and the corruption of bureaucracy persist, like the case of Kenya.

Second, the ideas of Nyerere and Kenyatta were key factors shaping the pattern of rural development. The function of political leaders as the driving force for rural development was to achieve the mobilization of the masses, to destroy ineffective administrative system, and to create new political, economic, and social structures for rural development. However, the personalization of government led to an absolute loyalty of political elites toward political leaders rather than their effective performances of policy. Hence, the incompetence of bureaucracy increased the discontent and alienation of the public which curtailed the expression, incentive, and participation of masses in the process of rural development.

Third, the cultures of Tanzania and Kenya were static with respect for traditions, like a superstitious beliefs, while western culture was dynamic. Also, immorality, like corruption, bribery, and lack of accountability, were part of Tanzanian and Kenyan cultures. As a result, authoritarian political culture induced authoritarian political system which limited rural development.

Fourth, in the process of rural development, Tanzania was not a democratic socialistic state but a bureaucratic socialistic one with a corruption of bureaucracy. Also, Kenya was not a democratic capitalistic state but an authoritarian capitalistic one with a depravity of bureaucracy. If the characteristic of state's bureaucracy is rational, efficiency, precision, discretion, and unity, then, the bureaucracy of state can function to protect individuals, to promote efficiency, and to obtain goal attainment.

IV. Liberal Developmental Strategy with Anti-Corruption

The capitalistic strategy for development is absolutely necessary with rational bureaucratic dominance which prevents corruption. The time needed to catch up with the developed world is getting shorter; the period that nations require to double economic output per person is shortening; Britain took 58 years (from 1780), the United States 47 years (from 1839), Japan 33 years (from the 1880s), Indonesia 17 years, South Korea 11 years, and China 10 years (Mabbubani, 1995:103). An unambiguous lesson is that increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity, as seen in South Korea, China, and Japan (Drucker, 1994:104). A failure for developmental strategy in Tanzania is socialistic developmental strategy based on the self-reliant economic system. The process of development has included the faster spread of technology, ideas, techniques, and capital across borders (Mabbubani, 1995:103). The real success of the Pacific community will come when the process of political, economic and cultural development in the Pacific becomes a blend of Western and Asian characters rather than Western or Asian ones (Mabbubani, 1995:107). Non-western civilizations will attempt continuously to obtain the wealth, technology, skills and civic culture that are part of being modern. Their functions of political agents have, in the end, been attempts to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values (Huntington; 1993:40). The corporate cultures evolving in both trade groups are neither exclusively Western nor Asian; a unique blend is emerging (Mabbubani, 1995:110).

Scholars have argued the factors of the difference in terms of the process of economic development and underdevelopment in Asia and Africa. One of the factors is the problem of corruption. Also, corruption is an outflow of 'financial domestic capital moved overseas rather than invested at home'. For instance, in Nigeria, 'more than \$400 billion was stolen from the treasury' by the leaders of Nigeria between 1960 and 1999. University of Massachusetts researchers estimated that from 1970 to 1996, 'capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan countries totaled \$187billion', exceeding the external debts of the nations. In the case of Africa, the factors for this behavior were political instability and the absence of civil society in order to prevent corruption.

Corruption, which brings about distortions and inefficiency, hinders and undermines political and economic development. In the economic sector, the cost of business has been increased by the phenomena of corruption 'through the price of

illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials, and the risk of breached agreements'. Ultimately, as corruption increases the cost of business, competitive system is prohibited that it is sustaining inefficient firms. Corruption has induced economic distortions, public investment is diverting 'where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful'. In the social sector, corruption facilitates the destruction of trust relation between social members. The corrupt countries may formally have strong economic selfish interest which has decreased the level of cooperation between social members, the measures provided by legislation to protect the social rights of ordinary people are not pursued. The violations of laws and rights in corrupt countries are plentiful. There is a strong relation between the effort for anti-corruption and Governance (Kaufmann, 2005). Social development and economic development lead to effective democracy (Putman, 1994). political-economy corruption leads to the different gap between demand and supply, which means the difference between politics and economy, that is after all deficit in democracy (Girling, 1997).

V. Conclusion

This article argues factors shaping underdevelopment, such as the lack of information and perception about rural areas, the corruption of bureaucracy, the ignorance of the role of state in development. The state is an important actor in rural development. The nature of state bureaucracy, state ideology, and policy networks linking state and society, as major key factors for rural development, is the crucial variable for determining strategies. When state capacity is not high enough to handle domestic social forces, like the dependent bourgeoisie, then the state become less autonomous. Also, when state capacity is not high enough to treat international actors, such as foreign capitals and multinational corporations, the weak state become dependent rather than interdependent on them. Only, strong and autonomous state with high capacity, including the type of strong state and independent state, can lead to the effective control of peasants, the demolition of authoritarian traditional culture, and the process of development in undeveloping countries. However, the expanded role of the state does not always bring high state's capacity to exercise the economic and social development. Only, the connection between the expanded role of the strong state and increased state's capacity can bring about development. Consequently, the long process of the

rationalization of bureaucracy can destroy the old beliefs and can create the institutional values of modern economics, politics, religion, and culture of Tanzania and Kenya in order to achieve economic and social development.

<Bibliography>

- Caide, Gernald E. (2007) *The Ideal and the real in combatting corruption in western style*, Paul Heywood, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- _____. (1997), "Political Corruption: Problem and Perspectives". *Political Corruption*, ed. Paul Heywood, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- Chambers, Robert, (1990), *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. New York: Longman.
- Drucker, Peter,F. (1994), Trade Lessons from the World Economy, *Foreign Affairs* 73 (January and February): 99-108.
- Girling, John, (1997), *Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy*, London and New York: Routledge
- Huntington, Samuel, P. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- _____. (1993), The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* 73(Summer):22-49.
- Hyden, Goran,(1980), *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kaufmann, D. (2006), *Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption*. World Bank
- Leonard, David K. (1991), *African Successes*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Leys, Colin, (1975), *Underdevelopment in Kenya*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mabbubani, Kisbore, (1995), *The Pacific Way*, *Foreign Affairs* 74 (January/ February) : 100-111.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. (1981), *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*. Mass: Havard University Press.
- Staudt, Kathleen, (1991), *Managing development: State, Society, and International Contexts*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1990), Towards a Global Culture, In *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity*, edited by Featherstone, Mike, 171-191, London: Sage.

- Vanhanen, Tatu(ed), (1992), *Strategies of Democratization*. Washington: Crane Russak.
- _____(ed.) (1990), *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-88*. New York: Crane Russak.
- Vogel, Ezra F. (1991), *The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia*. London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wilson, James Q. (1989), *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. USA: Basic Books.
- Transparency International, 2007, Web: www.transparency.org.
- Yeager, Rodger, (1989), *Tanzania: An African Experiment*. Boulder: Westview Press.