

The New Anti-Corruption Strategy in Korea: Focused on Socio-Cultural Environmental Education*

김 영 종 (Kim, Young Jong)**

ABSTRACT

The prevalent corruption phenomena in Korea seriously threaten the democratic structure of national development. One of the major causes of corruption in Korea is the "weaknesses" of ethics or morality among Korean public officials. This paper focuses on anti-corruption education as a new anti-corruption strategy to prevent corruption phenomena in Korea. To reduce corruption cases in Korea, the author suggests a new strategy that focuses on changing the cultural behavior and attitude toward corruption. By creating an ethical environment for public officials, this new strategy can be viewed as a developmental engine that can change norms of behavior. In this paper, the author contends that it is necessary to formalize such anti-corruption education in order to prevent the widespread corruption phenomena in Korea

Key words : Socio-Cultural Education, Anti-corruption Strategies, Lobbying Disclosure Act

* This work was supported by the Soong-Sil University Research Fund 본 연구는 숭실대학교 교내연구비 지원으로 이루어졌음

** 숭실대학교

Introduction

The best way to minimize the widespread corruption phenomena is to maximize the anti-corruption ethics and its mentality. The ethics has its origin in the Greek word *ethos*, meaning "personal disposition", "characteristic spirit", or "morals". Ethics can be described as the following:

"... the application of values to individual behavior and action. They provide the moral and legal basis for guiding personal conduct in different circumstances and situations ... and are reflected in laws and regulations, codes of behavior and professional standards" (Dwivedi, Engelbert 1981:143).

According to the Oxford Dictionary (Flower & Flower, 1964) ethics is a component of philosophy which deals with morality and values. Ethics can be separated from psychology in the sense that psychology is concerned with actual human behavior while ethics is concerned with what should be done. The difference between ethics and jurisprudence is that the latter investigates actual behavior for the purpose of determining if it is in agreement with the law. The former generates new patterns of behavior that are ahead of and above the law (Boling & Demsey, 1980:15). In other words, ethics is concerned with the norms of behavior with due observance of considerations outside the field of legislation. Therefore, ethics has a relationship not only with actual behavior, but also with morality or disposition of an action. In this paper, we attempt to maximize the effects of anti-corruption education by focusing on socio-cultural environment. This paper suggests a new anti-corruption paradigm that attempts to create an ethical environment for public officials in Korea.

* Major Issues of Anti-Corruption Strategies Culture and Corruption

Culture denotes the complexity of human beings' value system, life style, mentality, and customs. Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and

for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups.¹⁾ Humans are understood to be totally, inextricably immersed in culture. In other words, people are conditioned by the members of their society in countless, largely unconscious, ways to accept as natural and to follow rather uncritically the cultural patterns of that society. Thus, human beings are intertwined with everyday cultural life.

It is important to note the key relationship between culture and corruption. The key relationship between culture and corruption is that to people live in a culture where some degree of corruption exists. Culture is our everyday life itself, which means that we routinely take for granted on occurrences and happenings around us. To people living in a culture of corruption, corruption can be so common in people's daily lives that it becomes a norm of the society. Thus, corruption can be viewed as a *modus operandi* in the society which accepts corruption as a norm.

In Korea, corruption still prevails largely in different sector of Korean society. To some extent, the prevalent corruption phenomena in the fabrics of the society have been internalized and structuralized in the people's minds and mentality. Thus, corruption remains as social disease in Korea. Once it starts to infect one sector of society, spreading through the entire society can happen in just matter of short time. In order to reduce corruption in this type of culture, a new strategy is needed that focuses on how to change the culture of corruption.

Socio-Cultural Education

Education plays vital role in preventing corruption. Education by its own definition focuses on understanding and interpreting of knowledge. It helps to develop a logical and rational mind that can determine relationships between variables and thereby understand specific phenomena (Robbins, 1980:27).

1) A.L. Kroeber(1952), *The Nature of Culture* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 104-107.

Socio-cultural education approach to preventing corruption has several advantages:

- * It supports communication systems that public can understand and participate.
- * It supports government systems that ensures responsible and accountable public officials are in control.
- * It supports systems of law, regulations and practices governing the conduct of all bureaucrats.
- * It supports standards of conduct which prohibit the use of public office for self-interest or private gain or for improper preferential treatment to any person or for disclosing confidential information.
- * It supports to establish standards of conduct which will ensure fairness and justice for the people.
- * It supports to establish governmental and departmental policies in regards to public resources so that they are utilized in effective and efficient manner (Dwivedi & Engelbert, 1981:143-144).

Socio-cultural education also includes some degree of training. Training refers to the process of learning a sequence of programmed behaviors. It enables a person to solve specific problems and to apply knowledge. It also gives public officials (bureaucrats) and awareness of the applicable rules and procedures to guide their behavior (Robbins, 1980:27). Training can also alter the behavior and the knowledge and/or motivation of bureaucrats (Glueck, 1982:410).

*** Overview of Preventive Strategies against Corruption Anti-Corruption Legislation**

In order to prevent wide-spread corruption in Korea, the Korean governments in the past established several anti-corruption related legislation. In particular, the Anti-Corruption Act, which has been stipulated in 2001 (Act No.6494), was created to ensure clean climate of the civil service and society by preventing and regulating the acts of corruption efficiently. Interestingly, the article 2

defines the term "act of corruption" as one or more of the following: the act of any public official's abusing his position or authority or violating Acts; and the act of causing damages to the property of any public institution in violation of Acts in the process of executing the budget of the relevant public institution, acquiring, managing, or disposing of the property of the relevant public institution.

Also, it should be noted that the criminal law in article 130-132, amended 2001, was designed to punish bribery and any other corruption related behavior. In particular, corrupted behaviors of public officials may be checked by criminal law, anti-corruption act, and public service ethics law, and public officials' law, etc.

Anti-Corruption Agency

The main anti-corruption agency that was established to prevent corruption refers to Anti-corruption Commission in accordance with Article 10, the Anti-corruption Act of 2001. It was established to perform several functions: formulate and recommend policies, educate public and recommend corruption prevention program, cooperate with other countries, and protect whistle-blowers. Other agencies may aid in the anti-corruption activity. They include public prosecutors, BAI, police, and Inspector Team in every ministry of the government etc.

The anti-corruption mechanism in Korea is complex because the systems are dispersed into several different agencies. The anti-corruption mechanism includes several governmental agencies such as the Board of Audit and Inspection in accordance with the Constitutional Law of 1987 (article 97-100) under the President, Public Prosecutors' Offices, Presidential Office, Prime Minister's Office, and other Inspectors' Office under each Ministry of Cabinet. In addition, Commission for the Prevention of Corruption as an advisory committee for the chairman of the BAI has been established since 1993.

Rule of Law and Access to Justice

In the past, the Korean governments attempted to show strong support for rule of law and democracy. It was the most direct and simple approach to prevent corruption. In Korea, this type of principle and philosophy is reflected in all levels of public policy. The Constitutional Law of 1987, article 13 regulates "nulla poena sine lege, double jeopardy, retroactive law, family liability." In the process of applying rule of law, Korean citizens have general rights to appeal systems. Citizens are supposedly protected from detention without trial. In Constitutional Law and Civil Law protects individual property rights. However, it is true that in some cases, individual rights are not all protected and exceptions do exist.

Law Enforcement

In Korea, the law enforcement agency is effective because the appointments to the law enforcement agency are made according to professional criteria. Although the public budgeting for the agency is not sufficient, the members of the agency work effectively as possible. However, law enforcement is not sufficient to prevent corruption problems in Korea. Also, law enforcement agencies themselves are not immune from corruption.

Because of these concerns, the Korean government in the past passed two notable regulatory acts in regards to law enforcement: Public Prosecutor Act and Police Act. The Police Act amended in 2003 refers to provide the basis organization, extent of duty, and other necessary matters of the police for the democratic administration, operation and efficient execution of duty of the police. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor's Office Act of 1997 amended Public Prosecutors duties: investigation of crimes; supervision of judicial police; and supervision of the execution of criminal judgment.

* Korea: Republic of Lobbying Corruption (ROLC)?

In case of Korea, corruption is prevalent among government officials, public

officials or bureaucrats, businessmen, or even ordinary citizens. Because only few incidents are reported, it is necessary to observe corruption incidences with great care and comprehensiveness. In reality, these incidences may be a tip of the iceberg. Mass media have frequently called Korea as the ROTC (Republic of Total Corruption) or the ROTB (Republic of Total Bribery) on the basis of statistical data of corruption incidences. Korea could also be the ROTL (Republic of Total Lobby).

Lobbying behavior among citizens and bureaucrats, citizens and politicians, and businessmen and politicians have been so widely practiced. Lobbying is defined as "contacts and effort in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research, and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others" (House Reports, 1994; Graziano, 2001).²⁾

Most of corruption in lobbying involves dealing with unethical and illegal offers. This type of corruption erodes the moral fabric of Korean society; undermines democracy; violates the social and rights of the poor and the vulnerable; subverts the rule of law which is the basis of every society; and retards development; denies societies', particularly the poor, benefits of free and competition (Lima Declaration, 1997). To a certain extent, corruption related to lobbying activities is set as a norm.

Besides, corruption discourages productivity and brings distrust, but encourage social conflict, dissatisfaction, and complaining. As a result, people respond against their government as modes of collective behavior and social movement in terms of psychological perspective. The collective behaviors of the people might even accelerate against their government. At this point, corruption problems can become so severe that there is no public confidence in the government, and people often approve more drastic measures to correct the economic or political situation without any sound rationale basis.

In the case of Korea, most of corruption, especially political or administrative corruption has been created in the process of lobbying by interest groups. Interest groups assert their rights to be reflected in legislation or policymaking

2) See the detailed sources: House Reports(Nos.713-750)(1994, Jan.25-Nov.29), Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1994 Washington, D. C.: United Government Printing Office, 3 Luigi Graziano (2001), Lobbying, Pluralism and Democracy New York: Palgrave

for their benefit. During the lobbying process, secret dealings of money or other special offerings are transacted. This is a typical form of corruption in lobbying. Corruption in lobbying is widespread, and is similar to a culture of lobbying among interest groups or individuals.

In addition, the lobbying culture in Korea is not only on the basis of interest groups but also on the basis of nepotism. Nepotism is especially common since in Korean culture. It is customary to favor someone because of their same school background, same hometown or similar geographical background, and relative backgrounds.

*** Assessment of Corruption Incidences**

Specific assessment of corruption related incidences can help to understand the depth of corruption phenomena. This can be done through measuring the pervasiveness of corruption through survey, studies, investigation of incidences, etc. The correlation between cultures of corruption and quality of life (QOL) is greatly intertwined. The higher QOL, the less incidences of corruption occur. The lower the QOL, however, corruption is likely to be higher and possibility of forming a culture of corruption is great.

Some of the recent cases involving lobbying corruption is overwhelming in its scale. For example, the former President, Kim Young Sam's son was arrested and sentenced in the court as the first case of lobbying bribery (corruption) of President's family.³⁾ Ending one of the most publicized trials in the country's history, the South Korean court on found President Kim Young-Sam's son in 1997, Kim Hyun-Chul was found guilty of accepting bribes and evading taxes. He was a part of a broader scandal involving several leading businessmen. He admittedly took more than \$7 million in bribes from six businessmen seeking government favors. He admitted receiving the money, but said the funds were gifts with no strings attached. However, two businessmen testified during his trial that they paid him for political favors.

3) The Virtual Information Center (2002, May 15), Special Report, 1-11.

The prosecution had sought a seven-year term and \$5.2 million in fines for Kim Hyun-Chul, the president's second-oldest son.

Furthermore, former President, Kim, Dae Jung's two sons were also arrested because of lobbying corruption. In fact, Kim, Dae Jung was the opposition party leader when Kim, Young Sam's son was arrested. He strongly criticized the President, but ironically Kim, Dae Jung's sons were also involved in lobbying corruption (Yonhapnews:2003)⁴⁾ He was charged with receiving cash and shares worth 1.5 billion won (1.2 million dollars) in bribes from a sports betting firm.

These corruption incidences appear to be a tip of the iceberg. When all the activities of lobbying corruption are taken into account, Korea could be viewed as Republic of Lobbying Corruption (ROLC). The culture of corruption seems to have deeply rooted in the process of power related structuring. It might be included institutionalized corruption in various pockets of our society. ⁵⁾

"Two of the closest aids of the new president accused of accepting illegal contributions, an ex-president facing forfeiture in the amount of hundreds of billions of won for bribery while in office, and a ruling party leader serving his time in connection with a payoff scandal involving a bankrupt merchant bank.". More recently, the investigation by Special Counsel Song Doo-Hwan revealed some of the officials from the National Intelligence Service played a leading role in sending money to North Korea. That is, the lobbying culture also involved in the process of inter-Korean summit. Such findings have weakened the validity of the explanations given by Kim and his aids, leading the special counsel to come to a temporary conclusion that the money transfer effectively paid for the inter-Korean summit. TI reports corruption perception index every year. According to the report, the case of Korea shows us serious corruption phenomena although she is economically developing. As the following table shows, the CPI of Korea is relatively low level, 4.2(index), rank (50/133) as of 2003.

4) Yonhapnews(2003, May 28)in www.yonhapnews.net/news/ Dawn the Internet edition(2002, May 19) in www.dawn.com

5) Korea Herald(2003, May 28),6.

Table 1. Index of Perception of Corruption

Country	2001		2002		2003	
	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank
Iceland	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	9.6	2/133
Denmark	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	9.5	3/133
New Zealand	9.4	3/91	9.5	2/102	9.5	3/133
Singapore	9.2	4/91	9.3	5/102	9.4	5/133
Sweden	9.0	6/91	9.3	5/102	9.3	6/133
Netherlands	8.8	8/91	9.0	7/102	8.9	7/133
Australia	8.5	11/91	8.6	11/102	8.8	8/133
Norway	8.6	10/91	8.5	12/102	8.8	8/133
Switzerland	8.4	12/91	8.5	12/102	8.8	8/133
Canada	8.9	7/91	9.0	7/102	8.7	11/133
Luxembourg	8.7	9/91	9.0	7/102	8.7	11/133
United Kingdom	8.3	13/91	8.7	10/102	8.7	11/133
Austria	7.8	15/91	7.8	15/102	8.0	14/133
Hong Kong	7.9	14/91	8.2	14/102	8.0	14/133
Germany	7.4	20/91	7.3	18/102	7.7	16/133
Belgium	6.6	24/91	7.1	20/102	7.6	17/133
Ireland	7.5	18/91	6.9	23/102	7.5	18/133
United States	7.6	16/91	7.7	16/102	7.5	18/133
Chile	7.5	18/91	7.5	17/102	7.4	20/133
Israel	7.6	16/91	7.3	18/102	7.0	21/133
Japan	7.1	21/91	7.1	20/102	7.0	21/133
France	6.7	23/91	6.3	25/102	6.9	23/133
Spain	7.0	22/91	7.1	20/102	6.9	23/133
Portugal	6.3	25/91	6.3	25/102	6.6	25/133
Oman	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	6.3	26/133
Bahrein					6.1	27/133
Cyprus					6.1	27/133
Slovenia	5.2	34/91	6.0	27/102	5.9	29/133
Botswana	6.0	26/91	6.4	24/102	5.7	30/133
Taiwan	5.9	27/91	5.6	29/102	5.7	30/133
Qatar	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	5.6	32/133
Estonia	5.6	28/91	5.6	29/102	5.5	33/133
Uruguay	5.1	35/91	5.1	32/102	5.5	33/133
Italy	5.5	29/91	5.2	31/102	5.3	35/133
Kuwait	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	5.3	35/133
Malaysia	5.0	36/91	4.9	33/102	5.2	37/133
United Arab Emirates	8.4	12/91	9.0	7/102	5.2	37/133

Tunisia	5.3	31/91	4.8	36/102	4.9	39/133
Hungary	5.3	31/91	4.9	33/102	4.8	40/133
Lithuania	4.8	38/91	4.8	36/102	4.7	41/133
Namibia	5.4	30/91	5.7	28/102	4.7	41/133
Cuba					4.6	43/133
Jordan	4.9	37/91	4.5	40/102	4.6	43/133
Trinidad and Tobago	8.4	12/91	9.0	7/102	4.6	43/133
Belize					4.5	46/133
Saudi Arabia	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	4.5	46/133
Mauritius	4.5	40/91	4.5	40/102	4.4	48/133
South Africa	4.8	38/91	4.8	36/102	4.4	48/133
Costa Rica	4.5	40/91	4.5	40/102	4.3	50/133
Greece	4.2	42/91	4.2	44/102	4.3	50/133
South Korea	4.2	42/91	4.5	40/102	4.3	50/133
Belarus			4.8	36/102	4.2	53/133
Brazil	4.0	46/91	4.0	45/102	3.9	54/133
Bulgaria	3.9	47/91	4.0	45/102	3.9	54/133
Czech Republic	3.9	47/91	3.7	52/102	3.9	54/133
Jamaica	9.5	2/91	4.0	45/102	3.8	57/133
Latvia	3.4	59/91	3.7	52/102	3.8	57/133
Colombia	3.8	50/91	3.6	57/102	3.7	59/133
Croatia	3.9	47/91	3.8	51/102	3.7	59/133
El Salvador	3.6	54/91	3.4	62/102	3.7	59/133
Peru	4.1	44/91	4.0	45/102	3.7	59/133
Slovakia	9.2	4/91	9.3	5/102	3.7	59/133
Mexico	3.7	51/91	3.6	57/102	3.6	64/133
Poland	4.1	44/91	4.0	45/102	3.6	64/133
China	3.5	57/91	3.5	59/102	3.4	66/133
Panama	3.7	51/91	3.0	67/102	3.4	66/133
Sri Lanka	9.2	4/91	3.7	52/102	3.4	66/133
Syria	8.4	12/91	9.0	7/102	3.4	66/133
Bosnia-Herzegovina					3.3	70/133
Dominican Republic					3.3	70/133
Egypt	3.6	54/91	3.4	62/102	3.3	70/133
Ghana	3.4	59/91	3.9	50/102	3.3	70/133
Morocco	9.5	2/91	3.7	52/102	3.3	70/133
Thailand	3.2	61/91	3.2	64/102	3.3	70/133
Senegal	2.9	65/91	3.1	66/102	3.2	76/133
Turkey	3.6	54/91	3.2	64/102	3.1	77/133
Armenia					3.0	78/133
Iran	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	3.0	78/133

Lebanon	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	3.0	78/133
Mali	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	3.0	78/133
Palestine	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	3.0	78/133
India	2.7	71/91	2.7	71/102	2.8	83/133
Malawi	3.2	61/91	2.9	68/102	2.8	83/133
Romania	2.8	69/91	2.6	77/102	2.8	83/133
Mozambique	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	2.7	86/133
Russia	2.3	79/91	2.7	71/102	2.7	86/133
Algeria					2.6	88/133
Madagascar	9.5	2/91	1.7	98/102	2.6	88/133
Nicaragua	2.4	77/91	2.5	81/102	2.6	88/133
Yemen	2.9	65/91	2.7	71/102	2.6	88/133
Albania			2.5	81/102	2.5	92/133
Argentina	3.5	57/91	2.8	70/102	2.5	92/133
Ethiopia			3.5	59/102	2.5	92/133
Gambia	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	2.5	92/133
Pakistan	2.3	79/91	2.6	77/102	2.5	92/133
Philippines	2.9	65/91	2.6	77/102	2.5	92/133
Tanzania	2.2	82/91	2.7	71/102	2.5	92/133
Zambia	2.6	75/91	2.6	77/102	2.5	92/133
Guatemala	2.9	65/91	2.5	81/102	2.4	100/133
Kazakstan	2.7	71/91	2.3	88/102	2.4	100/133
Moldavia	3.1	63/91	2.1	93/102	2.4	100/133
Uzbekistan	2.7	71/91	2.9	68/102	2.4	100/133
Venezuela	2.8	69/91	2.5	81/102	2.4	100/133
Vietnam	2.6	75/91	2.4	85/102	2.4	100/133
Bolivia	2.0	84/91	2.2	89/102	2.3	106/133
Honduras	2.7	71/91	2.7	71/102	2.3	106/133
Macedonia	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	2.3	106/133
Serbia and Montenegro	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	2.3	106/133
Sudan	9.2	4/91	9.3	5/102	2.3	106/133
Ukraine	2.1	83/91	2.4	85/102	2.3	106/133
Zimbabwe	2.9	65/91	2.7	71/102	2.3	106/133
Republic of the Congo					2.2	113/133
Ecuador	2.3	79/91	2.2	89/102	2.2	113/133
Iraq	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	2.2	113/133
Sierra Leone	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	2.2	113/133
Uganda	1.9	88/91	2.1	93/102	2.2	113/133
Ivory Coast					2.1	118/133
Kirghizstan	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	2.1	118/133
Libya	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	2.1	118/133

Papua New Guinea	9.2	4/91	9.4	4/102	2.1	118/133
Indonesia	1.9	88/91	1.9	96/102	1.9	122/133
Kenya	2.0	84/91	1.9	96/102	1.9	122/133
Angola			1.7	98/102	1.8	124/133
Azerbaijan	2.0	84/91	2.0	95/102	1.8	124/133
Cameroon	2.0	84/91	2.2	89/102	1.8	124/133
Georgia	9.5	2/91	2.4	85/102	1.8	124/133
Tajikistan	8.4	12/91	9.0	7/102	1.8	124/133
Myanmar	9.5	2/91	9.5	2/102	1.6	129/133
Paraguay	9.2	4/91	1.7	98/102	1.6	129/133
Haiti	9.5	2/91	2.2	89/102	1.5	131/133
Nigeria	1.0	90/91	1.6	101/102	1.4	132/133
Bangladesh	0.4	91/91	1.2	102/102	1.3	133/133

Source: <http://www.transparency.org/>

Furthermore, the BPI reported by the TI in 2002 shows that Republic of Korea ranked 18th out of a total 21 of countries. As seen in Table 1-1, Korea scored only 3.9 out of 10. This is a very low figure, which supports the claim that culture of lobbying is deeply prevalent and structured in the society.

Table 2 BPI

Rank	Country	Score
1	Australia	8.5
2	Sweden	8.4
	Switzerland	8.4
4	Austria	8.2
5	Canada	8.1
6	Netherlands	7.8
	Belgium	7.8
8	United Kingdom	6.9
9	Singapore	6.3
	Germany	6.3
11	Spain	5.8

12	France	5.5
13	USA	5.3
	Japan	5.3
15	Malaysia	4.3
	Hong Kong	4.3
17	Italy	4.1
18	South Korea	3.9
19	Taiwan	3.8
20	People's Republic of China	3.5
21	Russia	3.2
	Domestic companies	1.9

Source: http://www.transparency.org//pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html

* Overall Anti-Corruption Education Strategy

Once the assessment of the pervasiveness of corruption is understood, the next step is to target different groups in societies in an attempt to decrease corruption problems in Korea. For instance, for government workers, better training and education would lead to the decrease of the corruption phenomena. Despite these different strategies depending on the organizations or type of corruption involved, the ultimate task, however, is to create a reform in the minds of the people.

There are certain requirements must be met in order to change the mentality of people living in the culture of corruption.

First, they must understand that corruption is simply wrong. This can be embarked by explaining the costs involved and the consequences of corruption. Second, ordinary citizens must believe that they are capable of breaking the culture of corruption through reform of mentality. Third, actions must be taken by refusing to cooperate in acts of corrupt behavior.

***New Paradigm for Anti-corruption Strategies: a focus on socio-cultural environmental education**

The ideal and most effective anti-corruption policy is to employ an internal and external paradigm. The author suggests a paradigm focusing on internal innovation paradigm or strategy to eliminate the culture of corruption and external paradigm focusing on effective anti-corruption legislation. In particular, as an example for the external paradigm, lobbying corruption will be used.

The internal paradigm is based on human ethics, morals and value. The cause of corruption for internal paradigm is due mostly to the culture and people's mentality and value system. The value system of units must be changed to reduce corruption. In this case, units may either be one person, a family or organization or even a few groups of people. Once internal paradigm is innovated, QOL will be higher and fewer incidences of corruption will occur.

The internal paradigm should focus on moral and ethical development. The moral development paradigm can be achieved by the formal education and social interactions regarding the anti-corruption program at the formal educational institutions, since as Kohlberg points out most moral development occurs through social interaction (Barger, 2000)⁶⁾ In other word, the practical strategy for internal paradigm should be focused on institutionalization of anti-corruption education, since education is one of the most important factors that have direct bearing on development.⁷⁾ The formal education system such as middle and high school or college education might be required to introduce the anti-corruption education in their regular curriculum. Also, the institutes of social education in Korean society should make it a proper system to teach for the students regarding the efficient and effective anti-corruption strategy.

The significance of the internal paradigm is exemplified in Korea's corruption history. Korea's corruption and people's attitude of corruption exemplifies how

6) See the detailed references as follows: Robert N. Barger(2000), A Summary of Lawrence Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development Notre Dame in www.nd.edu/~rbarger/kohlberg.html

7) Man Gap Lee (1982), Sociology and Social Change Seoul; Seoul National Press, 88-90.

culture can have impact on the mentality of ordinary people. For instance, the historic residues of the Korean history have influenced its political culture. Some of the patterns of Korean society and politics include submission to authority; hierarchical view of life; collectively passivity; centralization of administration; past or tradition oriented; ritual or formal oriented; loyalty to persons; and idealistic solutions.

The teaching of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and homogeneity allows the political powers to legitimize the authority, and has influenced the Korean political culture. Of all, Confucian doctrine was used as a vehicle for the ruling powers to highly centralize the government. Confucianism teaches submission to authority. A. F. Wright states:

A hierarchy of roles was through to be essential to the ideal order but Confucians insisted that the vital roles of functionary and perpetuator of the cultural heritage should be open to those of moral worth. The monarch who presided over the whole hierarchy had, in the utopia of remote antiquity, been chosen for his merit (Wright, 1962).

He also characterizes the Confucian education as submissiveness to authority—parents, and superiors—and to mores and norms; reverence for the past and respect for history preference for nonviolent moral reform in state society; and non-competitiveness (Wright, 1962).

Among these teachings, loyalty to persons can also be a source of corruption. Korean history has long been known for its homogeneous culture. People with different backgrounds form a tie based on educational training and regional backgrounds. What Koreans call 'jung' goes beyond the family boundary, it is the togetherness of one another that results in compassion, inclusion, and total involvement (Paik, 1997). It can be stated that jung as a similar concept to uiri, meaning 'we' in English. Paik examines the concept of uiri as returning another person's kindness, but states that if he rejects the request for favor from someone he knows well or if he distinguishes mine from yours in the use and ownership of things then that person is regarded as being unethical by others. Jung causes special ties to be recognized especially that of alumni factions and regional connections. Alumni faction refers to those that went to

the same universities and regional, and region means those who share common birthplaces.

Asking favors and acknowledging ties through personal relationships also take place in local community, government, and businesses. There are oftencases where businesses prefer recruiting high-ranking officials to create ties between them. The recruited high-ranking officials working for the business would ask favors to the officials that are in important decision-making positions (Kim, 2003). Conglomerates may also ask political power favors because of ties to the same university or region. Then, Jungor the personal relationship causes them to accept that favor.

Some counters argue the negative effects of Confucianism on society and its mentality toward corruption. They claim that Confucianism helped development and extended political democratization as well. Many share the view that Confucian work ethic which emphasizes hard work, diligence, and importance of education, social harmony, and loyalty to authority played an important role in the East Asian economic "miracle." Still many retain the view that the Confucian value system has been more than a contributing factor for democratic consolidation.

Overall, internal paradigm is necessary to change immorality and unethical behavior. The causes of unethical attitudes normally possess complex factors, especially in the information age we live in. However, although the definition of ethics is not always agreed upon, bribery and other misconducts must be discouraged. In terms of internal paradigm, the reduction of corruption can occur by having educational programs on ethical behavior and providing incentives.

As a part of internal paradigm, ideal anti-corruption strategy should include a self-innovation and self-moralizing mechanism. This raises the question: how do we control self and how should one enhance self-morality? Furthermore, at best, the highly sophisticated morality might be challenged by highly immoral society. How to win selfish greed as a nature of human beings also should be a problem. Interestingly, some scholars point out that self-moralizing might be impossible, because of original selfish greed by nature. Cynthia D. Moe-Lobeda, for instance, argues that "moral reasons is embodied, that is, inseparable form rather than independent of spirituality".⁸⁾ Therefore, they argue that spirituality

should be required in advance rather than self-moralizing in terms of religious perspective. Overall, despite the difficulty, the capability of internal paradigm to control corruption is potentially greater than the external paradigm to control corruption. However, the external paradigm also is necessary to create culture of anti-corruption in Korea.

The anti-corruption strategy in Korea has always focused its attention to the external paradigm. As a matter of fact, the anti-corruption related regulations are so diversified that it is in almost every government agency. In 2002, government stipulated a new anti-corruption law called "Anti-corruption Act" on the basis of Act.No.6469, July.24, 2001. This legislation, however, does not provide important provisions that are needed to effectively regulate corruption. For example, independent investigation power separated from the external political or administrative agencies have not been given to the anti-corruption committee. In Article 11 of the Act where the function of the anti-corruption commission is prescribed as the following,⁹⁾

1. The work of formulating and recommending policies and institutional improvement measures to prevent corruption in the public institutions;
2. The work of surveying the actual state and evaluating the progress of the policy steps taken to prevent corruption in the public institutions;
3. The work of working out and implementing the education and publicity schedule for the prevention of corruption;
4. The work of supporting activities carried out by nonprofit civic organizations to prevent corruption;
5. The work of promoting international cooperation for the prevention of corruption;
6. The work of receiving whistle blowing, etc. with respect to an act of corruption;
7. The work of protecting and recompensing whistle-blowers; and
8. The work of addressing matters that the President puts on the agenda of the Commission to prevent corruption.

The above-mentioned function of the ACC (Anti-Corruption Committee)

8) Cynthia D. Moe-Lobeda(2002), *Healing a Broken World: Globalization and God* Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 37.

9) See also the detailed contents of the Act in the following site: www.anticorruption.ac.kr

should be important, but it is noted that the ACC has not been admitted to investigate any corruption incidences independently without external intervention. Other countries such as CPIB in Singapore, the ICAC in Hong Kong or Australia provide such mechanisms. Independent investigation power is essential to effectively investigate alleged corruption incidences without political influences. Compared with other countries where anti-corruption act exists, the Korean Anti-corruption Act can be viewed as a nominal regulation.

Although Korean government has seen the evidences corruption in the lobbying culture through these types of major incidences, especially among politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen for a long time, legislation for anti-corruption in lobbying has yet to be created. The lobbying culture as a subculture of a culture of corruption has been customary in the country. Moreover, because there is no regulatory control mechanism for lobbying corruption, many reported cases of lobbying behaviors have, in fact, turned out to be serious corruption phenomena itself. Therefore, the author suggests one of very important external paradigm to control the lobbying culture in the country. A "Lobbying Disclosure Act"¹⁰⁾ needs to be passed in order to control lobbying corruption. Table 1-2 shows the details of Lobbying Disclosure Act.

Table 3. Outline of the Suggested "Lobbying Disclosure Act"

Contents Numbers	The Key Issues of the "Lobbying Disclosure Act"
1	The concept of lobby
2	The definition of lobbyist
3	The object of lobbying
4	The expenses and scope of lobbying activity
5	The registration of lobbyist
6	Qualifying lobbyists
7	The lobbyists' activity
8	The limitation of lobbyists'

10) "See detailed: Young Jong Kim(2002, Nov.)," A Policy for Preventing Lobbying Corruption" Legislation, Seoul; Minister of Legislation,19-33..

9	The transparency and disclosure of lobbyists'
10	The lobbyists' right
11	The duty of disclosure and transparency
12	The relation between the Lobbying Disclosure Act & the Anti-Corruption Act
13	Interest Groups

The above-mentioned key issues of the Act can be explained as follows:

- 1) The concept of lobby must be defined in this act. Tentatively, the concept of lobby refers to various activities: planning, data collection, research activity, etc.
- 2) Lobbyist refers to all registered role agents who have specific objectives for the interest group or groups.
- 3) The object of lobbying includes government agency, local government, and public organizations, which influence for the decision making of interest groups in the process of policymaking and implementation.
- 4) The expenses and scope of lobbying activity include a total of direct and indirect activity, which might influence for the policy maker and its total income and expenses.
- 5) The registration of lobbyist may be considered as a few suggestions such as office of congress, administrative agency, or independent agency.
- 6) Qualifying lobbyists who have licenses can be registered at the office in terms of license system by government. The limitation of numbers for registration per each interest group should be also regulated.
- 7) The lobbyists' activity refers to opinions making, data collection, research activity, and propaganda for interest groups.
- 8) The limitation of lobbyists' activity refers to nonintervention of political affairs, prohibition of lobbying behavior, providing bribery, and also prohibition of overlapping lobbying behavior.
- 9) The transparency and disclosure of lobbyists' account and budgeting is required for ordinary citizens every six-month.
- 10) The lobbyists' right refers to the institutional protection for the interest

groups' interest. On the other hand, lobbyists' responsibility refers to principles of sincerity and trust, confidential obedience, prohibition of double substitution, prohibition of interest's intervention, registration of property etc.

- 11) The duty of disclosure and transparency regarding lobbyists' activity refers to report management agency, major contents of report, report styles, period, and sanction for non-reporters.
- 12) The lobbying disclosure act should be closely related to anti corruption act. Under the current anti-corruption law in Korea there is no prohibition of lobbying behavior. Therefore, it might be required that the anti-corruption act might be necessary to accept this new legislation. Also, the public ethics' law and criminal laws might be considered to amend the related regulation in accordance with this law, by which those existed laws should be identified with this new legislation in terms of efficient and effective anti-corruption policy.
- 13) Finally, it might be seriously required that, if any person or interest groups violate the related regulations, strict sanction and punishment be complied with this new legislation.

***How to Strengthen Ethics?**

Ethics refer to the standards which guide the behavior and actions of bureaucrats and which may be referred to as moral laws. The adaptation and modernization of methods and procedures as well as technological progress (e.g., by means of education and training) is useless if the bureaucrats who must apply them to not aspire to high moral standards. Bureaucrats from different ethnic groups will however evaluate their ethical norms, among other things, according to their specific religious doctrines and their cultural difference. If ethics actions are expected of bureaucrats it is necessary that applicable training in ethical norms and standards be provided. There are two

different approaches to teaching ethics: classical approach and legalistic approach.

First, the classical approach which focuses on the Judeo-Christian philosophical tradition. This approach is based upon the values consistent with Western culture. This approach has throughout the world been unsuccessful due to cultural difference as well as political and organizational factors.

Second, the legalistic approach which focuses on laws and codes of ethics to attempt to make distinction between right and wrong. This approach has also been unsuccessful in practice, mainly because right and wrong are only relevant for part of the ethical dimension. The real ethical dilemma faced by bureaucrats is often the choice between right and right for which laws and regulations are seldom adequate. Third the environmental approach which aims at sensitizing bureaucrats to the power they wield and the kaleidoscope of values relevant to the ethical exercise of their position. This approach aims at ethics training to enable bureaucrats to raise the right questions, not to provide the right answers (Bok, 1976:26). To achieve this goal (Worthley 1981:45) suggests an ethics program consisting of four modules combining readings, practical exercises and case studies.

More specific desirable educational program can be summarized as follows:

First, a preventive education program should aim to explain to both public and private organizations and corruption and its prevention, as well as to motivate them to take preventive measures. Because circumstances and practices differ among different occupations and trades, it is important those anti-corruption messages are tailored to the special needs of the target groups concerned. They should be expressed in practical terms easily understood by the audience and appreciated by them to be affecting their own interest. Much research therefore is required to enable us to find the right messages.

Preventive education program can be conducted largely through personal contact. Staff of the community relations department pays personal visits to business organizations, government departments, schools, neighborhood associations, etc. They also organize talks, management seminars, workshops, exhibitions and a host of other educational activities.

Under aged group of people should be a priority target in order to achieve long-term impact in our fight against corruption. In addition, we have a moral

education program that aims at the higher goal of fostering sound values such as honesty, integrity and fair play in school children. Guiding young people to set higher moral standards of behavior is important.

Secondly, the mass media should focus on anti-corruption education by mobilizing the system in terms of intensive use of mass media and interpersonal approaches. In conveying the anti-corruption messages, a wide range of communication channels and techniques can be employed.

Third, adequate resources are needed to support effective community relations. Long term education efforts are demanding on resources. These include not only financial resources but human resources. Effective community relations work is labor-intensive. At the same time, staff having the right skills and training and, above all, the dedication and commitment to the anti-corruption cause is important.

***Conclusion**

We have shown that in the case of Korea corruption activity has often been considered as a norm. Since legislation, rules and proper reporting procedures are only a part of the solution, anti-corruption education was suggested as the key in preventing corruption in Korea.

The remaining question to be answered is what is an ethical norm? This question is difficult to answer in a straight manner since all types of dynamic situations can arise and fundamental differences exist among different societies. In capitalistic and utilitarian societies, values are different to those of a pluralistic representative democracy. A fundamental, honest difference exists, but a high level of trust and commitment, from all parties involved, can result in everyone trying to do the "*right thing*". Support and participation by will are necessary to create an ethical atmosphere. Ethical norm must be discovered through efforts of bureaucrats and people who are involved with the environmental values that they are comfortable to deal with.

Ultimately, the work of bureaucrats concerns decisions made and actions

taken toward the good of a collectivity, which we refer to as "the public". Decisions and actions "in the public interest" are however inevitably morally complex and needs in depth consideration. As a part of anti-corruption education, we needs to focus on improving sound decision making and reasoning process for Korean public officials. It is this author's belief that as a part of curriculum, every student of Public Administration/Management should have least one course dealing with the ethical dilemmas of decision-making

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저자약력 : 미국 플로리다 주립대학교에서 행정학박사를 취득하였고 현재, 숭실대 행정학 교수로 근무하고 있다. 학문적 관심분야로는 부패, 인사행정 등이다. (한국부패학회 초대회장)

저서: "부패학"(숭실대 출판사), "Public Sector Ethics"(Co-author) (The Federation Press)등 36권(공저포함)